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Abstract
A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of
economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings
where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game),
many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that
people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns.
We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like
to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game
correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable
implications, the validity of which we conﬁrm through new experiments.
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ﬁnancial support from the National Science Foundation through grant numbers SES-0551296 (Andreoni),
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Equal division of monetary rewards and/or costs is a widely observed behavioral norm. Fifty-
ﬁfty sharing is common in the context of joint ventures among corporations (e.g. Veuglers and
Kesteloot [1996], Dasgupta and Tao [1998], and Hauswald and Hege [2003]),1 share tenancy
in agriculture (e.g. De Weaver and Roumasset [2002], Agrawal [2002]), and bequests to
children (e.g. Wilhelm [1996], Menchik [1980, 1988]). “Splitting the diﬀerence” is a frequent
outcome of negotiation and conventional arbitration (Bloom [1986]). Business partners often
divide the earnings from joint projects equally, friends split restaurant tabs equally, and the
U.S. government splits the nominal burden of the payroll tax equally between employers and
employees. Compliance with a 50-50 norm has also been duplicated in the laboratory. Even
when one party has all the bargaining power (the dictator game), typically 20 to 30 percent
of subjects voluntarily cede half of a ﬁxed payoﬀ to another individual (Camerer [1997]).2
Our object is to develop a theory that accounts for the 50-50 norm in the dictator game,
one we hope will prove applicable more generally.3 Experimental evidence shows that a
signiﬁcant fraction of the population elects precisely 50-50 division even when it is possible
to give slightly less or slightly more,4 that subjects rarely cede more than 50% of the aggregate
payoﬀ, and that there is frequently a trough in the distribution of fractions ceded just below
50% (see, e.g., Forsythe et al. [1994]). In addition, choices depend on observability: greater
a n o n y m i t yf o rt h ed i c t a t o rl e a d sh i mt ob e h a v em o r es e l ﬁshly and weakens the norm,5 as do
treatments that obscure the dictator’s role in determining the outcome, or that enable him
to obscure that role.6 Ag o o dt h e o r yo fb e h a v i o ri nt h ed i c t a t o rg a m em u s ta c c o u n tf o ra l l
1Where issues of control are critical, one also commonly sees a norm of 50-plus-one-share.
2The frequency of equal division is considerably higher in ultimatum games; see Camerer [2003].
3Our theory is not necessarily a good explanation for all 50-50 norms. For example, Bernheim and
Severinov [2003] propose an explanation for equal division of bequests that involves a diﬀerent mechanism.
4For example, according to Andreoni and Miller [2002], a signiﬁcant fraction of subjects (15 to 30%)
adhered to equal division regardless of the sacriﬁce to themselves.
5In double-blind trials, subjects cede smaller amounts, and signiﬁcantly fewer adhere to the 50-50 norm
(e.g. Hoﬀman et al. [1996]). However, when dictators and recipients face each other, adherence to the
norm is far more common (Bohnet and Frey [1999]). Andreoni and Petrie [2004] and Rege and Telle [2004]
also ﬁnd a greater tendency to equalize payoﬀs when there is an audience. More generally, studies of ﬁeld
data conﬁrm that an audience increases charitable giving (Soetevent [2005]). Indeed, charities can inﬂuence
contributions by adjusting the coarseness of the information provided to the audience (Harbaugh [1998]).
6See Dana, Cain, and Dawes [2007], Dana, Weber, and Kuang [2007], and Broberg, Ellingsen, Johannesson
1these robust patterns.
The leading theories of behavior in the dictator game invoke altruism or concerns for
fairness (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockefels [2000]). One can reconcile
those hypotheses with the observed distribution of choices, but only by making awkward as-
sumptions — for example, that the utility function is fortuitously kinked, that the underlying
distribution of preferences contains gaps and atoms, or that dictators are boundedly ratio-
nal. Indeed, with a diﬀerentiable utility function, the fairness hypothesis cannot explain
why anyone would choose equal division (see Section 2, below). Moreover, neither altruism
nor a preference for fairness explains why observability, and hence audiences, play such an
important role in determining the norm’s strength.
This paper explores the implications of supplementing the fairness hypothesis with an
additional plausible assumption: people like to be perceived as fair. We incorporate that de-
sire directly into the utility function; alternatively, one could depict the dictator’s preference
as arising from concerns about subsequent interactions.7 Our model gives rise to a signaling
game wherein the dictator’s choice aﬀects others’ inferences about his taste for fairness. Due
to an intrinsic failure of the single-crossing property, the equilibrium distribution of transfers
replicates the choice patterns listed above: there is a pool at precisely equal division, and
no one gives either more or slightly less than half of the prize. In addition, consistent with
experimental ﬁndings, the size of the equal division pool depends on the observability of the
dictator’s choice. Thus, while our theory does leave some experimental results unexplained
(see, e.g., Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger [2008], or our discussion of Cherry et al. [2002]
in Section 2), it nevertheless has considerable explanatory power.
We also examine an extended version of the dictator game in which (a) nature sometimes
[2007]. Various papers have made a similar point in the context of the ultimatum game (Kagel, Kim, and
Moser [1996], Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels [1996], and Mitzkewitz and Nagel [1993]) and the hold-up problem
(Ellingsen and Johannesson [2005]). However, when the recipient is suﬃciently removed from the dictator,
the recipient’s potential inferences about the dictator’s motives have a small eﬀe c to nc h o i c e s( K o c ha n d
Normann [2008]).
7For example, experimental evidence reveals that the typical person treats others better when he believes
they have good intentions; see Blount [1995], Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund [2002], or Falk et al. [2008].
2intervenes, choosing an unfavorable outcome for the recipient, and (b) the recipient cannot
observe whether nature intervened. We demonstrate that the equilibrium distribution of
voluntary choices includes two pools, one at equal division and one at the transfer that na-
ture sometimes imposes. An analysis of comparative statics identiﬁes testable implications
concerning the eﬀects of two parameters. First, a change in the transfer that nature some-
times imposes changes the location of the lower pool. Second, an increase in the probability
that nature intervenes reduces the size of the equal division pool and increases the size of
the lower pool. We conduct new experiments designed to test those implications. Subjects
exhibit the predicted behavior to a striking degree.
The most closely related paper in the existing theoretical literature is Levine [1998]. In
Levine’s model, the typical individual acts generously to signal his altruism so that others will
act more altruistically toward him. Though Levine’s analysis of the ultimatum game involves
some obvious parallels with our work, he focuses on a diﬀerent behavioral puzzle.8 Most
importantly, his analysis does not account for the 50-50 norm.9 He explicitly addresses only
one feature of the behavioral patterns discussed above — the absence of transfers exceeding
50 percent of the prize — and his explanation depends on restrictive assumptions.10 As a
general matter, a desire to signal altruism (rather than fairness) accords no special status
to equal division, and those who care a great deal about others’ inferences will potentially
make even larger transfers.
One can view this paper as providing possible microfoundations for theories of warm-
glow giving (Andreoni [1989, 1990]). It also contributes to the literature that explores the
8With respect to the ultimatum game, Levine’s main point is that, with altruism alone, it is impossible
to reconcile the relatively low frequency of selﬁsh oﬀers with the relatively high frequency of rejections.
9None of the equilibria Levine describes involves pooling at equal division. He exhibits a separating
equilibrium in which only a single type divides the prize equally, as well as pooling equilibria in which no
type chooses equal division. He also explicitly rules out the existence of a pure pooling equilibrium in which
all types choose equal division.
10In Levine’s model, the respondent’s inferences matter to the proposer only because they aﬀect the
probability of acceptance. Given his parametric assumptions, an oﬀer of 50 percent is accepted irrespective
of inferences, so there is no beneﬁtt oah i g h e ro ﬀer. If one assumes instead that a more favorable social image
always has positive incremental value, then those who are suﬃciently concerned with signaling altruism will
end up transferring more than 50 percent. Rotemberg [2007] extends Levine’s analysis and applies it to the
dictator game, but imposes a maximum transfer of 50 percent by assumption.
3behavioral implications of concerns for social image (e.g., Bernheim [1994], Ireland [1994],
Bagwell and Bernheim [1996], Glazer and Konrad [1996]). Recent contributions in that
general area include Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008], Tadelis [2007], and Manning [2007].
Our study is also related to the theoretical literature on psychological games,i nw h i c hp l a y e r s
have preferences over the beliefs of others (as in Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1989]).
With respect to the experimental literature, our work is most closely related to a small
collection of papers (cited in footnote 6) that study the eﬀects of obscuring either a subject’s
role in dividing a prize or his intended division. By comparing obscured and transparent
treatments, those experiments have established that subjects act more selﬁshly when the
outcomes that follow from selﬁsh choices have alternative explanations. We build on that
literature by focusing on a class of games for which it is possible to derive robust comparative
static implications from an explicit theory of audience eﬀects; moreover, instead of studying
o n eo b s c u r e dt r e a t m e n t ,w et e s tt h es p e c i ﬁc implications of our theory by varying two key
parameters across a collection of obscured treatments.
More broadly, the experimental literature has tended to treat audience eﬀe c t sa su n f o r t u -
nate confounds that obscure “real” motives. Yet casual observation and honest introspection
strongly suggest that people care deeply about how others perceive them, and that those
concerns inﬂuence a wide range of decisions. Our analysis underscores both the importance
and feasibility of studying audience eﬀects with theoretical and empirical precision.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model, Sections 3 and 4 provide
theoretical results, Section 5 describes our experiment, and Section 6 concludes. Proofs of
theorems appear in the Appendix. Other referenced appendices are available on-line.
2 The model
Two players, a dictator (D) and a receiver (R), split a prize normalized to have unit value.
Let x ∈ [0,1] denote the transfer R receives; D consumes c =1− x. With probability
1−p, D chooses the transfer, and with probability p, nature sets it equal to some ﬁxed value,
4x0; then the game ends. The parameters p and x0 are common knowledge, but R cannot
observe whether nature intervened. For the standard dictator game, p =0 .
Potential dictators are diﬀerentiated by a parameter t, which indicates the importance
placed on fairness; its value is D’s private information. The distribution of t is atomless
and has full support on the interval [0,t]; H denotes the CDF.11 We deﬁne Hs as the CDF
obtained from H conditioning on t ≥ s. D cares about his own prize, c,a n dh i ss o c i a l
image, m, as perceived by some audience A, which includes R (and possibly others, such as
the experimenter). Preferences over c and m correspond to a utility function, F(c,m),t h a t
is unbounded in both arguments, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing (with,
for some f>0, F1(c,m) >ffor all c ∈ [0,1] and m ∈ R+), and strictly concave in c. D
also cares about fairness, judged by the extent to which the outcome departs from the most
fair alternative, xF.T h u s , w e w r i t e D’s total payoﬀ as





We assume G is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and reaches a maximum
at zero. We follow Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000] in assuming
the players see themselves as equally meritorious in the standard dictator game, so that
xF = 1
2. Experiments by Cherry et al. [2002] suggest that a diﬀerent standard may apply
when dictators allocate earned wealth. While our theory does not explain the apparent
variation in xF across contexts, it can in principle accommodate that variation.12
Note that the dictator’s preferences over x and m violate the single crossing property.
Picture his indiﬀerence curves in the x,m-plane. As t increases, the slope of the indiﬀerence
11Some experiments appear to produce an atom in the choice distribution at 0, though the evidence for
this pattern is mixed (see e.g., Camerer [2003]). Our model does not produce that pattern (for p =0or
x0 > 0) unless we assume that there is an atom in the distribution of types at t =0 . Because the type
space is truncated below at 0, it may be reasonable to allow for that possibility. One could also generate a
choice atom at zero with p =0by assuming that some individuals do not care about social image (in which
case the analysis would be more similar to the case of p>0 and x0 =0 ). In experiments, it is also possible
that a choice atom at zero results from the discreteness of the choice set and/or approximate optimization.
12If the players are asymmetric with respect to publicly observed indicia of merit, the fairness of an outcome
might depend on the extent to which it departs from some other benchmark, such as xF =0 .4.P r o v i d e d
the players agree on xF, similar results would follow, except that the behavioral norm would correspond to
the alternate benchmark. However, if players have diﬀerent views of xF, matters are more complex.
5curve through any point (x,m) declines if x<1
2, but rises if x>1
2. Intuitively, comparing
any two dictators, if x<1
2 t h eo n ew h oi sm o r ef a i r - m i n d e di n c u r sas m a l l e ru t i l i t yp e n a l t y
when increasing the transfer, because inequality falls; however, if x>1
2 that same dictator
incurs a larger utility penalty when increasing the transfer, because inequality rises.
Social image m depends on A’s perception of D’s fairness. We normalize m so that, if A
is certain D’s type is b t,t h e nD’s social image is b t.W e u s e Φ to denote the CDF representing
A’s beliefs about D’s type, and B(Φ) to denote the associated social image.
Assumption 1: (1) B is continuous (where the set of CDFs is endowed with the weak
topology). (2) min supp(Φ) ≤ B(Φ) ≤ max supp(Φ), with strict inequalities when the
support of Φ is non-degenerate. (3) If Φ0 is “higher” than Φ00 in the sense of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, then B(Φ0) >B (Φ00).
As an example, B might calculate the mean of t given Φ. For some purposes, we impose
a modest additional requirement (also satisﬁed by the mean):
Assumption 2: Consider the CDFs J, K,a n dL, such that J(t)=λK(t)+(1−λ)L(t).I f
max supp(L) ≤ B(J),t h e nB(J) ≤ B(K), where the second inequality is strict if the
ﬁr s ti ss t r i c to ri ft h es u p p o r to fL is nondegenerate.13
The audience A forms an inference Φ about t after observing x. Even though D does
not observe that inference directly, he knows A will judge him based on x,a n dt h e r e f o r e
accounts for the eﬀect of his decision on A’s inference. Thus, the game involves signaling.
We will conﬁne attention throughout to pure strategy equilibria. A signaling equilibrium
consists of a mapping Q from types (t) to transfers (x), and a mapping P from transfers (x)
to inferences (Φ). We will write the image of x under P as Px (rather than P(x)), and use
Px(t) to denote the inferred probability that D’s type is no greater than t upon observing x.
13It is perhaps more natural to assume that if max supp(L) ≤ B(K),t h e nB(J) ≤ B(K), where the second
inequality is strict if the ﬁr s ti ss t r i c to ri ft h es u p p o r to fL is nondegenerate. That alternative assumption,
in combination with Assumption 1, implies Assumption 2 (see Lemma 5 in Andreoni and Bernheim [2007]).
6Equilibrium transfers must be optimal given the inference mapping P (for all t ∈ [0,t], Q(t)
solves maxx∈[0,1] U(x,Px,t)), and inferences must be consistent with the transfer mapping Q
(for all x ∈ Q([0,t]) and t ∈ [0,t], Px(t)=prob(t0 ≤ t | Q(t0)=x)).
We will say that Q is an equilibrium action function is there exists P such that (Q,P) is
a signaling equilibrium. Like most signaling models, ours has many equilibria, with many
distinct equilibrium action functions. Our analysis will focus on equilibria for which the
action function Q falls within a speciﬁc set, Q1 for the standard dictator game (p =0 )a n d
Q2 for the extended dictator game (p>0), both deﬁned below. We will ultimately justify
those restrictions by invoking a standard reﬁnement for signaling games, the D1 criterion (due
to Cho and Kreps [1987]), which insists that the audience attribute any action not chosen in
equilibrium to the type that would choose it for the widest range of conceivable inferences.14
Formally, let U∗(t) denote the payoﬀ to type t in a candidate equilibrium (Q,P),a n df o r
each (x,t) ∈ [0,1]×[0,t] deﬁne mx(t) as the value of m that satisﬁes U(x,m,t)=U∗(t).L e t
Mx =a r gm i n t∈[0,t] mx(t) if mint∈[0,t] mx(t) ≤ t,a n dMx =[ 0 ,t] otherwise. The D1 criterion
requires that, for all x ∈ [0,1]\Q([0,t]), Px places probability only on the set Mx.
If the dictator’s type were observable, the model would not reproduce observed behavior:
every type would choose a transfer strictly less than 1
2 and there would be no gaps or atoms
in the distribution of voluntary choices, apart from an atom at x =0(see Andreoni and
Bernheim [2007]). Henceforth, we will use x∗(t) to denote the optimal transfer for type t
when type is observable (i.e., the value of x that maximizes U(x,t,t)).
3 Analysis of the standard dictator game
For the standard dictator game, we will focus on equilibria involving action functions be-
longing to a restricted set, Q1.T o d e ﬁne that set, we must ﬁrst describe diﬀerentiable
14We apply the D1 criteria once rather than iteratively. Similar results hold for other standard criteria
(e.g. divinity). We acknowledge that experimental tests have called into question the general validity of
equilibrium reﬁnements for signaling games (see, e.g., Brandts and Holt [1992, 1993, 1995]). Our theory
nevertheless performs well in this instance, possibly because the focalness of the 50-50 norm coordinates
expectations.
7action functions that achieve local separation of types. Consider a simpler game with p =0
and types lying in some interval [r,w] ⊆ [0,t]. In a separating equilibrium, for each type
t ∈ [r,w], t’s choice, denoted S(t), must be the value of x that maximizes the function
U(x,S−1(x),t) over x ∈ S([r,w]). Assuming S is diﬀerentiable, the solution satisﬁes the
ﬁrst order condition dU
dx =0 . Substituting x = S(t) into the ﬁrst order condition, we obtain:
S
0(t)=−





− F1 (1 − S(t),t)
.( 1 )
The preceding expression is a non-linear ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation. We will be
concerned with solutions with initial conditions of the form (r,z) (a choice z for type r)s u c h
that z ≥ x∗(r). For any such initial condition, (1) has a unique solution, denoted Sr,z(t).15
In the Appendix (Lemma 3), we prove that, for all r and z with z ≥ x∗(r), Sr,z(t) is strictly
increasing in t for t ≥ r, and there exists a unique type t∗
r,z >r(possibly exceeding t)t o
which Sr,z(t) assigns equal division (i.e., Sr,z(t∗
r,z)=1
2).
Now we deﬁne Q1. The action function Q belongs to Q1 if and only if it falls into one of
the following three categories:
Eﬃcient diﬀerentiable separating action function: Q(t)=S0,0(t) for all t ∈ [0,t],
where S0,0(t) ≤ 1
2.
Central pooling action function: Q(t)=1
2 for all t ∈ [0,t].
B l e n d e da c t i o nf u n c t i o n s :There is some t0 ∈ (0,t) with S0,0(t0) < 1
2 such that, for
t ∈ [0,t 0],w eh a v eQ(t)=S0,0(t),a n df o rt ∈ (t0,t],w eh a v eQ(t)=1
2.
We will refer to equilibria that employ these types of action functions as, respectively,
eﬃcient diﬀerentiable separating equilibria, central pooling equilibria,a n dblended equilibria.





, so that the lowest type
weakly prefers to be in the pool rather than choose his ﬁrst-best action and receive the worst
15If z = x∗(r),t h e nS0(r) is undeﬁned, but the uniqueness of the solution is still guaranteed; one simply



















Figure 1: A Blended Equilibrium






that the highest type that separates is indiﬀerent between separating and joining the pool.16
Figure 1 illustrates a blended equilibrium. Types separate up to t0, and higher types
choose equal division. An indiﬀerence curve for type t0 (It0) passes through both point A,
the separating choice for t0,a n dp o i n tB, the outcome for the pool. The indiﬀerence curve
for any type t>t 0 through point B (It>t0)i sﬂatter than It0 to the left of B and steeper to
the right. Therefore, all such types strictly prefer the pool to any point on S0,0(t) below t0.
The following result establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibria within Q1 and
justiﬁes our focus on that set.
Theorem 1: Assume p =0and that Assumption 1 holds. Restricting attention to Q1,
there exists a unique equilibrium action function, QE.I t i s a n e ﬃcient diﬀerentiable
separating function iﬀ t ≤ t∗
0,0.17 Moreover, there exists an inference mapping PE such
that (QE,PE) satisﬁes the D1 criterion, and for any other equilibrium (Q,P) satisfying
16Remember that Ht0 is deﬁned as the CDF obtained starting from H (the population distribution) and
conditioning on t ≥ t0. Because of t0’s indiﬀerence, there is an essentially identical equilibrium (diﬀering
from this one only on a set of measure zero) where t0 resolves its indiﬀerence in favor of 1
2 (that is, it joins
the pool).
17A c c o r d i n gt ot h eg e n e r a ld e ﬁnition given above, t∗
0,0 is deﬁned by the equation S0,0(t∗
0,0)=1
2.
9that criterion, Q and QE coincide on a set of full measure.
Thus, our model of behavior gives rise to a pool at equal division in the standard dictator
game if and only if the population contains suﬃciently fair-minded people (t>t ∗
0,0). To
appreciate why, consider the manner in which the single-crossing property fails: a larger
transfer permits a dictator who cares more about fairness to distinguish himself from one
who cares less about fairness if and only if x<1
2.T h u s , x = 1
2 serves as something of
a natural boundary on chosen signals. In standard signaling environments (with single
crossing), the D1 criterion isolates either separating equilibria or, if the range of potential
choice is suﬃciently limited, equilibria with pools at the upper boundary of the action set
(Cho and Sobel [1990]). In our model, 1
2 is not literally a boundary, and indeed there are
equilibria in which some dictators transfer more than 1
2. However, there is only limited
scope in equilibrium for transfers exceeding 1
2 (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix) and those
possibilities do not survive the application of the D1 criterion. Accordingly, when t is
suﬃciently large, dictators who seek to distinguish themselves from those with lower values
of t by giving more “run out of space, ” and must therefore join a pool at x = 1
2.18
Note that our theory accounts for the behavioral patterns listed in the introduction.
First, provided that the some people are suﬃciently fair-minded, there is a spike in the
distribution of choices precisely at equal division, even if the prize is perfectly divisible.
Second, no one transfers more than half the prize. Third, no one transfer slightly less than
half the prize (recall that S0,0(t0) < 1
2 for blended equilibria). Intuitively, if a dictator
intends to divide the pie unequally, it makes no sense to divide it only slightly unequally,
since negative inferences about his motives will overwhelm the tiny consumption gain.
Our theory also explains why greater anonymity for the dictator leads him to behave
18Despite some surface similarities, the mechanism producing a central pool in this model diﬀers from
those explored in Bernheim [1994] and Bernheim and Severinov [2003]. In those papers, the direction of
imitation reverses when type passes some threshold; types in the middle are unable to adjust their choices
to simultaneously deter imitation from the left and from the right. Here, higher types always try to deter
imitation by lower types, but are simply unable to do that once x reaches 1
2. The main result here is also
cleaner in the following sense: in Bernheim [1994] and Bernheim and Severinov [2003], there is a range of
possible equilibrium norms; here, equal division is the only possible equilibrium norm.
10more selﬁshly and weakens the 50-50 norm. Presumably, treatments with less anonymity
cause dictators to attach greater importance to social image. Formally, we say that e U
attaches more importance to social image than U if e U(x,m,t)=U(x,m,t)+φ(m),w h e r eφ
is diﬀerentiable, and φ
0(m) is strictly positive and bounded away from zero. The addition of
the separable term φ(m) allows us to vary the importance of social image without altering
the trade-oﬀ between consumption and equity.
The following result tells us that an increase in the importance attached to social image
increases the extent to which dictators conform to the 50-50 norm:
Theorem 2: Assume p =0 , and that Assumption 1 holds. Suppose e U attaches more
importance to social image than U.L e t e π and π denote the measures of types
choosing x = 1
2 for e U and U, respectively (based on the equilibrium action functions
e QE,Q E ∈ Q1). Then e π ≥ π, with strict inequality when π ∈ (0,1).
4 Analysis of the extended dictator game
Next we explore the theory’s implications for our extended version of the dictator game.
With p>0 and x0 close to zero, the distribution of voluntary choices has mass not only at
1
2 (if t is suﬃciently large), but also at x0. Intuitively, the potential for nature to choose x0
regardless of the dictator’s type reduces the stigma associated with voluntarily choosing x0.
Moreover, as p increases, more and more dictator types are tempted to “hide” their selﬁshness
behind nature’s choice. That response mitigates the threat of imitation, thereby allowing
higher types to reduce their gifts as well. Accordingly, the measure of types voluntarily
choosing x0 grows, while the measure of types choosing 1
2 shrinks.
We will focus on equilibria involving action functions belonging to a restricted set, Q2.
To simplify notation, we deﬁne St ≡ St,max{x0,x∗(t)}. The action function Q belongs to Q2 if
and only if it falls into one of the following three categories:
Blended double-pool action function: There is some t0 ∈ (0,t) and t1 ∈ (t0,t) with
11St0(t1) < 1
2 such that, for t ∈ [0,t 0],w eh a v eQ(t)=x0;f o rt ∈ (t0,t 1],w eh a v e
Q(t)=St0(t);a n df o rt ∈ (t1,t],w eh a v eQ(t)=1
2.
Blended single-pool action function: There is some t0 ∈ (0,t) with x∗(t0) ≥ x0 and
St0(t) < 1
2 such that, for t ∈ [0,t 0],w eh a v eQ(t)=x0,a n df o rt ∈ (t0,t],w eh a v e
Q(t)=St0(t).
Double-pool action function: There is some t0 ∈ (0,t) such that, for t ∈ [0,t 0],w eh a v e
Q(t)=x0,a n df o rt ∈ (t0,t],w eh a v eQ(t)=1
2.
We will refer to equilibria that employ such action functions as, respectively, blended
double-pool equilibria, blended single-pool equilibria,a n ddouble-pool equilibria. In a blended












∗(t0)},t 0,t 0) ,( 2 )
where b H
p
t0 is the CDF for types transferring x0.19 Also, type t1 must be indiﬀerent between














Finally, if x0 > 0, type 0 must weakly prefer the lower pool to his ﬁrst-best action combined







,0) .( 4 )
In a blended single pool equilibrium, (2) and (4) must hold. Finally, in a double-pool
equilibrium, expression (4) must hold; also, type t0 must be indiﬀerent between pooling at 1
2
and pooling at x0, and must weakly prefer both to all x ∈ (x0, 1
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Figure 2: A Blended Double-Pool Equilibrium
Figure 2 illustrates a blended double-pool equilibrium for x0 =0 . The indiﬀerence curve
It0 indicates that type t0 is indiﬀerent between the lower pool (point A) and separating with
its ﬁr s tb e s tc h o i c e ,x∗(t0) (point B). All types between t0 and t1 choose a point on the
separating function generated using point B as the initial condition. The indiﬀerence curve
It1 i n d i c a t e st h a tt y p et1 is indiﬀerent between separating (point C)a n dt h eu p p e rp o o la t
x = 1
2 (point D). A blended single-pool equilibrium omits the pool at 1
2, and a double-pool
equilibrium omits the interval with separation of types.
Because (4) is required for all three types of equilibria described above, we will impose a
condition on x0 and p that guarantees it:















is continuous in t, so the minimization is well-deﬁned; moreover,






> 0.T h e r e f o r e , f o r a l l p>0,( 6 )i ss a t i s ﬁed as long as x0 is not
t o ol a r g e . O n ec a na l s os h o wt h a t ,f o ra n yx0 such that U(x0,B(H),0) >U (0,0,0),( 6 )i s
satisﬁed for p suﬃciently large.
The following theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibria within Q2
and justiﬁes our focus on that set.
13Theorem 3: Assume p>0, that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that (6) is satisﬁed.20
Restricting attention to Q2, there exists a unique equilibrium action function, QE.I f
t is suﬃciently large, QE is either a either a double-pool or blended double-pool action
function. Moreover, there exists an inference mapping PE such that (QE,PE) satisﬁes
the D1 criterion, and for any other equilibrium (Q,P) satisfying that criterion, Q and
QE coincide on a set of full measure.
The unique equilibrium action function in Q2 has several notable properties. For volun-
tary c h o i c e s ,t h e r ei sa l w a y sm a s sa tx0. Nature’s exogenous choice of x0 induces players to
“hide” their selﬁshness by mimicking that choice. There is never positive mass at any other
choice except 1
2. As before, there is a gap in the distribution of choices just below 1
2.21 In
addition, one can show that both t0 and t1 are monotonically increasing in p.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
as p increases, the mass at x0 grows, and the mass at x = 1
2 shrinks. Formally:
Theorem 4: Assume p>0, that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that (6) is satisﬁed. Let
π0 and π1 denote the measures of types choosing x = x0 and x = 1
2, respectively (based
on the equilibrium action function QE ∈ Q2). Then π0 is strictly increasing in p,a n d
π1 is decreasing (strictly if positive) in p.22
After circulating an earlier draft of this paper, we became aware of work by Dana et al.
[2006] and Broberg et al. [2007], which shows that many dictators are willing to sacriﬁce
part of the total prize to opt out of the game, provided that the decision is not revealed
to recipients. Though we did not develop our theory with those experiments in mind, it
20With some additional arguments, our analysis extends to arbitrary p and x0. The possible equilibrium
conﬁgurations are similar to those described in the text, except that there may also be an interval of
separation involving types with t near zero who chose transfers below x0 along S0,0. For some parameter
values, existence may be problematic unless one slightly modiﬁes the game, e.g., by allowing the dictator to
reveal his responsibility for the transfer.
21One can also show that a gap just above x0 deﬁnitely forms for p suﬃciently close to unity, and deﬁnitely
does not form for p suﬃciently close to zero. However, since we do not attempt to test those implications,
we omit a formal demonstration for the sake of brevity.
22One can also show that the measure of types choosing x = x0 converges to zero as p approaches zero;
see Andreoni and Bernheim [2007].
14provides an immediate explanation. Opting out permits the dictator to avoid negative
inferences while acting selﬁshly. In that sense, opting out is similar (but not identical) to
choosing an action that could be attributable to nature. Not surprisingly, a positive mass of
dictator types take that option in equilibrium. For details, see Appendix A (on-line).
5 Experimental Evidence
We designed a new experiment to test the theory’s most direct implications: increasing p
should increase the mass of dictators who choose any given x0 (close to zero) and reduce the
mass who split the payoﬀ equally. Thus, we examine the eﬀects of varying both p and x0.
5.1 Overview of the experiment
We divide subjects into pairs, with partners and roles assigned randomly. Each pair splits a
$20 prize. To facilitate interpretation, we renormalize x, measuring it on a scale of 0 to 20.
Thus, equal division corresponds to x =1 0rather than x =0 .5. Dictators, recipients, and
outcomes are publicly identiﬁed at the conclusion of the experiment to heighten the eﬀects
of social image. For our purposes, there is no need to distinguish between intrinsic concern
for an audience’s reaction and concern arising from subsequent social interaction.23
We examine choices for four values of p (0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75) and two values of x0 (0
and 1). Identifying the distribution of voluntary choices for eight parameter combinations
requires a great deal of data.24 One possible approach is to use the strategy method: ask
each dictator to identify binding choices for several games, in each case conditional on nature
not intervening, and then choose one game at random to determine the outcome. Unfortu-
nately, that approach raises two serious concerns. First, in piloting the study, we discovered
that subjects tend to focus on ex ante fairness — that is, the equality of expected payoﬀs
23A similar statement applies to concerns involving experimenter demand eﬀects in dictator games (see,
e.g., List [2007]). Our experiment creates demand eﬀects that mirror those present in actual social situations.
Because they are the objects of our study, we do not regard them as confounds.
24Suppose, for example, that we wish to have 30 observations of voluntary choices for each parameter
combination. If each pair of subjects played one game, the experiment would require 1,000 subjects and
$15,000 in subject payments.
15before nature’s move. If a dictator knows that nature’s intervention will favor him, he may
compensate by choosing a strategy that favors the recipient when nature does not intervene.
While that phenomenon raises some interesting questions concerning ex ante versus ex post
fairness, concerns for ex ante fairness are properly viewed as confounds in the context of our
current investigation. Second, the strategy method potentially introduces unintended and
confounding audience eﬀects. If a subject views the experimenter as part of the audience,
the possibility that the experimenter will make inferences about the subject’s character from
his strategy rather than from the outcome may inﬂuence his choices. Our theory assumes
the relevant audience lacks that information.
We address those concerns through the following measures. (1) We use the strategy
method only to elicit choices for diﬀerent games, and not to elicit the subject’s complete
strategy for a game. For each game, the dictator is only asked to make a choice if he has been
informed that his choice will govern the outcome. Thus, within each game, each decision
is made ex post rather than ex ante, so there is no risk that the experimenter will draw
inferences from portions of strategies that are never executed. (2) We modify the extended
dictator game by making nature’s choice symmetric: nature intervenes with probability p,
transferring x0 and 20 − x0 with equal probabilities (p/2). That symmetry neutralizes
the tendency among dictators to compensate for any ex ante asymmetry in nature’s choice.
Notably, this modiﬁcation does not alter the theoretical results described in Section 4.25 (3)
Our procedures guarantee that no one can associate any dictator with his or her strategy.
We make that point evident to subjects. (4) Subjects’ instructions emphasize that everyone
present in the lab will observe the outcome associated with each dictator. We thereby focus
the subjects’ attention on the revelation of particular information to a particular audience.
See Appendix B (on-line) for details concerning our experimental protocol, and Appendix D
25For the purpose of constructing an equilibrium, the mass at 20 − x0 can be ignored. It is straightfor-
ward to demonstrate that all types will prefer their equilibrium choices to that alternative, given it will be
associated with the social image B(H). They prefer their equilibrium choices to the action chosen by t,a n d
must prefer that choice to 20−x0, because it provides more consumption, less inequality, and a better social
image.
16(on-line) for the subjects’ instructions.
We examine two experimental conditions, one with x0 =0(“condition 0”) and one with
x0 =1(“condition 1”). Each pair of subjects is assigned to a single condition, and each
dictator makes choices for all four values of p. Thus, we identify the eﬀects of x0 from
variation between subjects, and the eﬀects of p from variation within subjects. When p =0
we should observe the same distribution of choices for both conditions, including a spike at
x =1 0 ,a5 0 - 5 0s p l i t . F o rp =0 .25, a second spike should appear, located at x =0for
condition 0 and at x =1for condition 1. As we increase pto 0.50 and 0.75 the spikes at 10
should shrink and the spikes at x0 should grow.
The subjects were 120 volunteers from undergraduates economic courses at the University
of Wisconsin—Madison in March and April 2006. We divided them into 30 pairs for each
condition; unexpected attrition left 29 pairs for condition 1. Each subject maintained the
same role (dictator or recipient) throughout.
The closest existing parallel to our experiment is the “plausible deniability” treatment
of Dana et al. [2007], which diﬀers from ours in the following ways: (a) the probability
that nature intervenes depends on the dictator’s response time, (b) only two choices are
available, and nature chooses both with equal probability, so that no choice is unambiguously
attributable to the dictator, and (c) the eﬀects of variations in the likelihood of intervention
and the distribution of nature’s choice are not examined.
5.2 Main Findings
Figures 3 and 4 show the distributions of dictators’ voluntary choices in condition 0 (x0 =0 )
and condition 1 (x0 =1 ), respectively. For ease of presentation, we group values of x into
ﬁve categories: x =0 ,x=1 , 2 ≤ x ≤ 9,x=1 0 ,and x>10.26 In both conditions, as in
previous experiments, transfers exceeding half the prize are rare.27
These ﬁgures provide striking conﬁrmation of our theory’s predictions. Look ﬁrst at
26Although subjects were permitted to choose any division of the $20 prize, and although they were
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Figure 3: Distribution of Amounts Allocated to Partners, Condition 0
Figure 3 (condition 0). For p =0we expect a spike at x =1 0 . Indeed, 57 percent of
dictators divided the prize equally. Consistent with results obtained from previous dictator
experiments, a substantial fraction of subjects (30 percent) chose x =0 .28 As we increase p
we expect the spike at x =1 0to shrink and the spike at x =0to grow. That is precisely
what happens. Note also that no subject chose x =1for any value of p.
Look next at Figure 4 (condition 1).Again, for p =0we expect a spike at x =1 0 .
chosen allocations involved whole dollars.
27 For condition 0, there were three violations of this prediction (involving two subjects) out of 139 total
choices. One subject gave away $15 when p =0 . A second subject gave away $15 in one of two instances
with p =0 .25(but gave away $10 in the other instance), and gave away $11 when p =0 .75. For condition
1, there were only two violations (involving just one subject) out of 134 total choices. That subject chose
x =1 9with p =0 .5and 0.75. When asked to explain her choices on the post-experiment questionnaire,
she indicated that she alternated between giving $1 and $19 in order to “give me and my partner equal
opportunities to make the same $.” Thus, despite our precautions, she was clearly concerned with ex ante
fairness. The total numbers of observations reported here exceeds the numbers reported in Tables 1 and 2
because here we do not average duplicative choices for p =0 .25.
28For instance, the fraction of dictators who kept the entire prize was 35 percent in Forsythe et al. (1994)
and 33 percent in Bohnet and Frey (1999). In contrast to our experiment, however, no dictators kept the
entire prize in Bohnet and Frey’s “two-way identiﬁcation” condition. One potentially important diﬀerence
is that Bohnet and Frey’s subjects were all students in the same course, whereas our subjects were drawn
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Figure 4: Distribution of Amounts Allocated to Partners, Condition 1
Indeed, 69 percent of dictators divide the prize equally, while 17 percent keep the entire
prize (x =0 ) ,a n do n l y3 %( o n es u b j e c t )c h o s ex =1 . As we increase p the spike at x =1 0
once again shrinks. In this case, however, a new spike emerges at x =1 .A s p increases
to 0.75, the fraction of dictators choosing x =1rises steadily from 3 percent to 48 percent,
while the fraction choosing x =1 0falls steadily from 69 percent to 34 percent. Notably,
the fraction choosing x =0falls in this case from 17 percent to 10 percent. Once again, the
eﬀect of variations in p on the distribution of choices is dramatic, and exactly as predicted.
Table 1 addresses the statistical signiﬁcance of these eﬀects by reporting estimates of two
random-eﬀects probit models. The speciﬁcations in columns (1)-(2) describe the probability
of selecting x = x0; those in column (3)-(4) describe the probability of selecting x =1 0 ,e q u a l
division. The explanatory variables include indicators for p ≥ 0.25, p ≥ 0.5, p =0 .75,a n d
x0 =1(with p ≥ 0 and x0 =0omitted). In all cases, we report marginal eﬀects at mean
values, including the mean of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. We pool data from
both conditions; similar results hold for each condition separately.
19TABLE 1
Random eﬀects probit models:
Marginal eﬀects for regressions describing
(1)-(2) the probability of choosing x = x0 and
(3)-(4) the probability choosing x =1 0(equal division).†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(x = x0)P r ( x = x0)P r ( x =1 0 ) P r ( x =1 0 )
p ≥ 0.25 0.467*** 0.467*** -0.532*** -0.532***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.124) (0.124)
p ≥ 0.50 0.346*** 0.345*** -0.175* -0.196**
(0.129) (0.113) (0.133) (0.116)
p =0 .75 -0.002 -0.042
(0.132) (0.130)
x0 =1 -0.524*** -0.524*** 0.224 0.224
(0.179) (0.179) (0.219) (0.219)
Observations 236 236 236 236
† Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: *** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05,*α < 0.1,o n e - s i d e dt e s t s
The coeﬃcients in column (1) imply that there is a statistically signiﬁcant increase in
pooling at x = x0 when p rises from 0 to 0.25 and from 0.25 to 0.5 (α <. 01, one tailed
t-test), but not when p r i s e sf r o m0 . 5t o0 . 7 5 .T h es i g n i ﬁcant negative coeﬃcient for x0 =1
may reﬂect the choices of a subset of subjects who are unconcerned with social image, and
who therefore transfer nothing. Dropping the insigniﬁcant p =0 .75 indicator has little eﬀect
on the other coeﬃcients (column (2)). The coeﬃcients in column (3) imply that there is a
statistically signiﬁcant decline in pooling at x =1 0when p r i s e sf r o m0t o0 . 2 5( α <. 01,o n e
tailed t-test) and from 0.25 to 0.5 (α <. 1, one tailed t-test), but not when p rises from 0.5
to 0.75. As shown in column (4), the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei np from 0.25 to 0.5 on pooling at
x =1 0becomes even more statistically signiﬁcant when we drop the insigniﬁcant p =0 .75
indicator (α <. 05, one tailed t-test).
As an additional check on the model’s predictions, we compare choices across the two
conditions for p =0 . As predicted, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two dis-
tributions (Mann-Whitney z =0 .670,α < 0.50, Kolmogorov-Smirnov k =0 .13,α < 0.95).
The higher fraction of subjects choosing x =0in condition 0 (30 percent versus 17 percent)
and the higher fraction choosing x =1in condition 1 (3 percent versus 0 percent) suggest a
20modest anchoring eﬀect, but that pattern is also consistent with chance (comparing choices
of x =0 ,we ﬁnd t =1 .145,α < 0.26).
Our theory implies that, as p increases, a subject in condition 0 will not increase his gift,
x. Five of 30 subjects violate that monotonicity prediction; for each, there is one violation.
The same prediction holds for condition 1, with an important exception: an increase in p
could induce a subject to switch from x =0to x =1 .W e ﬁnd four violations of monotonicity
for condition 1, but two involve switches from x =0to x =1 . Thus, problematic violations
of monotonicity are relatively uncommon (11.9 percent of subjects).
As a further check on the validity of our main assumptions concerning preferences, and
to assess whether our model generates the right predictions for the right reasons, we also
examined data on attitudes and motivations obtained from a questionnaire administered
after subjects completed the experiment. Self-reported motivations correlated with their
choices in precisely the manner our theory predicts. For details, see Appendix C (on-line).
6 Concluding Comments
We have proposed and tested a theory of behavior in the dictator game that is predicated
on two critical assumptions: ﬁrst, people are fair-minded to varying degrees; second, people
like others to see them as fair. We have shown that this theory accounts for previously
unexplained behavioral patterns. It also has sharp and testable ancillary implications which
new experimental data conﬁrm.
Narrowly interpreted, this study enriches our understanding of behavior in the dictator
game. More generally, it provides a theoretical framework that potentially accounts for the
prevalence of the equal division norm in real-world settings. Though our theory may not
provide the best explanation for all 50-50 norms, it nevertheless deserves serious consideration
in many cases. In addition, this study underscores both the importance and feasibility of
studying audience eﬀects, which potentially aﬀect a wide range of real economic choices,
with theoretical and empirical precision.
21Appendix





is weakly increasing in t.
Proof: Consider two types, t and t0 with t<t 0. Suppose type t chooses x earning











. Mutual non-imitation requires f0 + t0g0 ≥ f + t0g and
f0 + tg0 ≤ f + tg;t h u s ,(g0 − g)(t0 − t) ≥ 0.S i n c et0 − t>0, it follows that g0 − g ≥ 0. ¤
Lemma 2: Suppose Q(t) > 1
2.D e ﬁne x0 < 1











. Then for all t0 >t , Q(t0) ∈ {x0,Q(t)} if p =0 ,a n dQ(t0) ∈ {x0,Q(t),x 0} if
p>0.29










.T o p r o v e t h i s l e m m a ,
we show that the inequality cannot be strict unless p>0 and Q(t0)=x0. Suppose on
t h ec o n t r a r yt h a ti ti ss t r i c tf o rs o m et0, and either p =0 ,o rp>0 and Q(t0) 6= x0.L e t









.S i n c eG is single-peaked, Q(t0) <Q (t). Thus, all types,
including t,p r e f e rQ(t0) to Q(t), a contradiction. ¤
Lemma 3: Assume z ≥ x∗(r).( a )Sr,z(t) >x ∗(t) for t>r .( b )F o ra l lt>r , S0
r,z(t) > 0.
(c) If Sr,z(t0) ≤ 1
2 and Sr,z(t00) ≤ 1
2,t y p et0 ≥ 0 strictly prefers (x,m)=( Sr,z(t0),t 0) to
(Sr,z(t00),t 00). (d) There exists t∗
r,z >rsuch that Sr,z(t∗)=1
2.( e ) Sr,z(t) is increasing in z
and continuous in r and z.
Proof: (a) First consider the case of z>x ∗(r). Suppose the claim is false. Then,
since the solution to (1) must be continuous, there is some t0 such that Sr,z(t0)=x∗(t0) and
Sr,z(t) >x ∗(t) for r ≤ t<t 0.A s t approaches t0 from below, S0
r,z(tk) increases without
bound (see (1)). In contrast, given our assumptions about F and G,t h ed e r i v a t i v eo fx∗(t)
is bounded within any neighborhood of t0.B u tt h e nSr,z(t) − x∗(t) must increase over some
interval (t00,t 0) (with t00 <t 0), which contradicts Sr,z(t0) − x∗(t0)=0 .
Now consider the case of z = x∗(r).I f U1(x∗(r),r,r)=0 ,t h e nS0
r,z(r) is inﬁnite (see (1))
29As a corollary, it follows that there is at most one value of x greater than 1













=0 . In either case, Sr,z(t) >x ∗(t) for t slightly larger than r;o n et h e n
applies the argument in the previous paragraph.
(b) Given (1), the claim follows directly from part (a).
(c) Consider t0 and t00 with Sr,z(t0),S r,z(t00) ≤ 1




























r,z(t)+F2 (1 − Sr,z(t),t)
¾
dt =0
where the inequality follows from Sr,z(t) < 1
2, and where the ﬁnal equality follows from (1).
The argument for t00 <t 0 is symmetric.
(d) Assume the claim is false. Because Sr,z(t) is continuous, we have Sr,z(t) ∈ (0, 1
2)
for arbitrarily large t. Using the boundedness of F1 (implied by the continuous diﬀer-
entiability of F)a n dt h eu n b o u n d e d n e s so fF in its second argument, we have limt→∞
[U (Sr,z(t),t,r) − U(Sr,z(r),r,r)] > 0, which contradicts part (c).
(e) If z>z 0,t h e nSr,z(r) >S r,z0(r). Because the two trajectories are continuous and
(for standard reasons) cannot intersect, we have Sr,z(t) >S r,z0(t) for all t>r .C o n t i n u i t y
in r and z follows from standard properties of the solutions of diﬀerential equations. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
Step 1A: If t>t ∗
0,0, there is at most one equilibrium action function in Q1,a n di tm u s t
be either a central pooling or blended equilibrium action function.






is strictly decreasing in t for t>t ∗
0,0,s oa c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1 ,
S0,0 cannot be an equilibrium action function.
For t ∈ [0,t ∗





.T h e e x i s -
tence and uniqueness of a solution are trivial given our assumptions; continuity of ψ follows













which implies that ψ(t) is strictly decreasing in t on [0,t ∗
0,0). N o t et h a tw ec a nr e w r i t et h e
23weak preference condition for a central pooling equilibrium as ψ(0) ≤ B (H), and the indif-
ference condition for a blended equilibrium as ψ(t0)=B (Ht0) for t0 ∈ (0,t ∗
0,0).
First suppose ψ(0) ≤ B (H). B(Ht) is plainly strictly increasing in t and ψ(t) is strictly
decreasing, so there is no t0 ∈ (0,t ∗
0,0) for which ψ(t0)=B (Ht0), and hence no blended
equilibrium action function; if there is an equilibrium action function in Q1,i te m p l o y s
the unique central pooling action function. Next suppose ψ(0) >B (H), so there is no
central pooling equilibrium. Note that ψ(t∗
0,0)=t∗
0,0 <B (Ht∗
0,0). The existence of a unique
t0 ∈ (0,t ∗
0,0) with ψ(t0)=B (Ht0) follows from the continuity and monotonicity of B(Ht)
and ψ(t) in t. Thus, there is at most one blended equilibrium action function.
Step 1B: If t ≤ t∗
0,0, there is at most one equilibrium action function in Q1,a n di tm u s t
be an eﬃcient diﬀerentiable separating action function.
Notice that B(Ht)=t ≤ ψ(t). Given the monotonicity of B(Ht) and ψ(t) in t,w eh a v e
B(Ht) < ψ(t) for all t ∈ [0,t), which rules out both blended equilibria and central pooling
equilibria. There is at most one eﬃcient diﬀerentiable separating equilibrium action function
because the solution to (1) with initial condition (r,z)=( 0 ,0) is unique. ¤
Step 1C: There exists an equilibrium action function QE ∈ Q1 a n da ni n f e r e n c ef u n c t i o n
PE such that (QE,PE) satisﬁes the D1 criterion.
Suppose t ≤ t∗
0,0.L e t QE = S0,0. Choose any inference function PE such that PE
x
places probability only on S
−1
0,0(x) for x ∈ [0,S 0,0(t)] (which guarantees consistency with
QE), and only on Mx (deﬁned at the outset of Section 3) for x>S 0,0(t). Lemma 3(c)
guarantees that, for each t, QE(t) is optimal within the set [0,S 0,0(t)].S i n c e ( i ) t prefers
its equilibrium outcome to (S0,0(t),t),( i i )S0,0(t) ≥ S0,0(t) >x ∗(t) (Lemma 3(a) and (b)),
and (iii) B(PE
x ) ≤ t (Assumption 1, part (2)), we know that t also prefers its equilibrium
outcome to all (x,B(PE
x )) for x>S 0,0(t).T h u s , (QE,PE) satsiﬁes the D1 criterion.
Now suppose t>t ∗
0,0 and ψ(0) ≤ B (H).L e tQE(t)=1
2 for all t. Consider the inference
function PE such that PE
1/2 = H (which guarantees consistency with QE)a n dPE
x places all
weight on type t =0for each x 6= 1
2.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t0 ∈ Mx for all x 6= 1
2,a n dt h a t
24all types t prefer (1
2,H) to (x,0).T h u s , (QE,PE) satisﬁes the D1 criterion.
Finally suppose t>t ∗
0,0 and ψ(0) >B (H).L e t t0 satisfy ψ(t0)=B (Ht0) (step 1A
showed that a solution exists within (0,t ∗
0,0)). For t ∈ [0,t 0),l e tQE(t)=S0,0(t),a n d
for t ∈ [t0,t],l e tQE(t)=1
2. Choose any inference function PE such that (i) PE
x places
probability only on S
−1
0,0(x) for x ∈ [0,S 0,0(t0)],( i i )PE
1/2 = Ht0, and (iii) PE
x places probability
only on Mx∩[0,t 0] for x ∈ (S0(t0), 1
2)∪(1
2,1].I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tMx∩[0,t 0] is non-empty
for x ∈ (S0,0(t0), 1
2) ∪ (1
2,1] (because for t>t 0, mx(t) >m x(t0)), so the existence of such
an inference function is guaranteed. Parts (i) and (ii) guarantee that PE is consistent with
QE. It is easy to verify (based on Lemma 3(c) and a simple additional argument) that, for









x ) ≤ t0, from which it follows (by another simple argument) that no type prefers
(x,B(PE
x )) to its equilibrium outcome. Thus, (QE,PE) satisﬁes the D1 criterion.
Step 1D: If an equilibrium (Q,P) satisﬁes the D1 criterion, there is no pool at any
action other than 1
2.
Suppose there is a pool that selects an action x0 6= 1
2. Select some t0 from the pool











, B (Px00) ≥ t0. Assuming x00 is chosen by some type in equilibrium, the claim
follows from Lemma 1. Assuming x00 is not chosen by any type in equilibrium, it is easy
to check that mx00(t00) >m x00(t0) for any t00 <t 0;w i t hx00 suﬃciently close to x0,w eh a v e
mx00(t0) < t, which then implies t00 / ∈ Mx00, and hence B (Px00) ≥ t0. The lemma follows from
the claim, because t0 would deviate at least slightly toward 1
2.
Step 1E: If an equilibrium (Q,P) satisﬁes the D1 criterion, type t =0selects either
x =0or x = 1
2.
Suppose Q(0) / ∈ {0, 1
2}.B ys t e p1 D ,PQ(0) places probability one on type 0. But then








, which contradicts the premise that
Q(0) is optimal for type 0.
Step 1F: For any equilibrium (Q,P) satisfying the D1 criterion, Q and QE (the unique
25equilibrium action function within Q1) coincide on a set of full measure.
Lemma 2 and step 1D together imply Q(t) ≤ 1
2 for all t ∈ [0,t).L e tt0 =s u p {t ∈ [0,t] |
Q(t) < 1
2} (if the set is empty, then t0 =0 ).
We claim that Q(t)=S0,0(t) for all t ∈ [0,t 0).B y L e m m a 1 , Q(t) is weakly increasing on
t ∈ [0,t); hence Q(t) < 1
2 for t ∈ [0,t 0).B y s t e p 1 D , Q(t) fully separates all types in [0,t 0),
and is therefore strictly increasing on that set. Consider the restricted game in which the
type space is [0,t 0−ε] and the dictator chooses x ∈ [0,Q(t0−ε)] for small ε > 0.I t i s e a s y t o
construct another signaling model for which the type space is [0,t 0−ε], the dictator chooses
x ∈ R, preferences are the same as in the original game for (x,m) ∈ [0,Q(t0−ε)]×[0,t 0−ε],
and conditions (1)-(5) and (7) of Mailath [1987] are satisﬁed on the full domain R×[0,t 0−ε].
Theorem 2 of Mailath [1987] therefore implies that Q(t) (which we have shown achieves full
separation on [0,t 0))m u s ts a t i s f y( 1 )o n[0,t 0 −ε] for all ε > 0. The desired conclusion then
follows from step 1E, which ties down the initial condition, Q(0) = 0.
There are now three cases to consider: (i) t0 =0 , (ii) t0 ∈ (0,t),a n d( i i i )t0 = t.I n c a s e
(i), we know that Q(t)=1
2 for t ∈ (0,t] (t is included by Lemma 1). It is easy to check that
if Q is an equilibrium, then so is Q∗(t)=1
2 for all t ∈ [0,t] (for the same inferences, if type
0 has an incentive to deviate from Q∗, then some type close to zero would have an incentive
to deviate from Q). In case (ii), we know that Q(t)=S0,0(t) for t ∈ [0,t 0) and Q(t)=1
2 for
t ∈ (t0,t]. It is easy to check that if Q is an equilibrium, then so is Q∗(t)=Q(t) for t 6= t0
and Q∗(t0)=S0,0(t0). In case (iii), we know that Q(t)=S0,0(t) for t ∈ [0,t).I t i s e a s y
to check that if Q is an equilibrium, then so is Q∗(t)=S0,0(t) for t ∈ [0,t]. I ne a c hc a s e ,
Q∗ ∈ Q1,a n dQ and Q∗ coincide on a set of full measure. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2: F i r s tw ec l a i mt h a tS0,0(t) < e S0,0(t) for all t.I ti se a s yt oc h e c k
that S0
0,0(0) < e S0
0,0(0),s oS0,0(t) < e S0,0(t) for small t. If the claim is false, then since the
separating functions are continuous, t0 =m i n
n
t>0 | S0,0(t)=e S0,0(t)
o
is well-deﬁned. It is
easy to check that S0
0,0(t0) < e S0
0,0(t0); moreover, because the slopes of the separating functions
vary continuously with t,t h e r ei ss o m et00 <t 0 such that S0
0,0(t) < e S0
0,0(t) for all t ∈ [t00,t 0].
26But since S0,0(t00) < e S0,0(t00), we must then have S0,0(t0) < e S0,0(t0), a contradiction.
Deﬁne ψ(t) as in step 1A of the proof of Theorem 1, and deﬁne e ψ(t) for e U analogously.
Note that for t ∈ (0,t ∗











. It follows that e ψ(t) < ψ(t).
If π =1 ,t h e nψ(0) ≤ B(H),s oe ψ(0) <B (H), which implies e π =1(see step 1A
of the proof of Theorem 1). If π ∈ (0,1),t h e nψ(0) >B (0), and there is a unique
blended equilibrium for which t0 solves B(Ht0)=ψ(t0). In that case, either e ψ(0) ≤ B(0),
which implies e π =1> π,o re ψ(0) >B (0) and B(Ht0) > e ψ(t0), which implies (given the
monotonicity properties of B and e ψ) B(Hh t0)=e ψ(e t0) for e t0 <t 0, and hence e π > π. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
Step 3A: Equation (2) has a unique solution, t∗
0 ∈ (0,t).





= F (1 − max{x0,x ∗(t)},t)+
tG
¡
max{x0,x ∗(t)} − 1
2
¢
. It is easy to check that for t ∈ [0,t], ξ(t) exists and satisﬁes




















Thus, by continuity, there must exist at least one value of t0 ∈ (0,t) satisfying (2).
Now suppose, contrary to the claim, that there are two solutions to (2), t0 and t00,
with t0 >t 00.D e ﬁne a CDF L(t) ≡
H(min{t,t0})−H(min{t,t00})











t00(t)+( 1− λ)L(t) where λ =
p+(1−p)H(t00)












.N e x t n o t e t h a t ξ
0(t)=
©












[F2 (1 − x0,ξ(t))]
−1 >













, which contradicts the supposition that t00 is a solution.















When it exists, it is unique, and t0 ∈ (0,t ∗
0].





,t h e nζ(t)=
30For t such that x∗(t) ≥ x0, the envelope theorem allows us to ignore terms involving dx∗(t)/dt.T h u s ,
even when x∗(t)=x0, the left and right derivatives are identical.











Existence, uniqueness, and continuity of ζ(t) are easy to verify. Moreover, the equality

















− U (max{x0,x ∗(t)},t,t) exceeds zero for t<t ∗
0, is less than zero for
t>t ∗
0, and equals zero at t = t∗
0. Consequently, the inequality in (5) holds iﬀ t0 ≤ t∗
0.






for t0 ∈ [0,t ∗
0].


















. The right-hand side of this expression is strictly in-
creasing in t, and the left-hand side is strictly increasing in ζ. Consequently, there exists
b t ∈ [0,t] such that ζ(t)=0for t ∈ [0,b t),a n dζ(t) is strictly increasing in t for t ≥ b t.






is weakly decreasing in t for t ∈ [0,t ∗
0]. Consider any two values,
t0, t00 ≤ t∗






.D e ﬁning L(t)






































































for all t<b t, so any solutions to (5) must lie in [b t,t∗
0].














, continuity guarantees that a solution






weakly decreasing in t on [b t,t∗
0] ,t h e
solution is unique. Because ζ(0) = 0 <B (H), we can rule out t0 = b t =0 .

















































. Given the monotonicity






for all t<t ∗
0. Hence there exists no t0 satisfying (5).














, there is at most one equilib-
rium action function in Q2, and it must be a double-pool action function.



























(where the ﬁrst inequality follows
from Lemma 3(c), the second from t∗
0 <t 1, St∗
0(t1) < 1
2, and (3), and the third from t∗
0 <t 1),

































(where the ﬁrst inequal-
ity follows from Lemma 3(c), the second from xm ≤ x∗(t) <S t∗
0(t) ≤ 1
2,a n dt h et h i r df r o m
t>B (Ht∗
0)), contradicting the supposition. Finally, since the solution for (5) is unique (step
3B), there can be at most one double-pool equilibrium action function.














, there is at most one equilib-
rium action function in Q2.I f St∗
0(t) > 1
2, it must be a blended double-pool action function.
If St∗
0(t) ≤ 1
2, it must be a blended single-pool action function.
By step 3B, (5) has no solution, so double-pool equilibria do not exist. From step 3A,
the value of t∗
0 is uniquely determined. Analytically, ruling out blended single-pool equilibria




2) in the extended dictator game
is analogous to ruling out eﬃcient separating equilibria (blended equilibria) when S0,0(t) > 1
2
(S0,0(t) ≤ 1
2) in the standard dictator game; we omit the details to conserve space.
Step 3E: I f( 6 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, there exists an equilibrium action function QE ∈ Q2 and an
inference function PE such that (QE,PE) satisifes the D1 criterion.














,l e tQE be the double-pool action func-

















2,l e tQE be a blended single-pool action function for which
the highest type in the pool at x0 is t∗

















2,l e tQE be a blended double-pool action function for which the highest type in
the pool at x0 is t∗
0, and the highest type in the separating region is the t1 that solves (3). In
each case, one can verify that, for all t ∈ [0,t], QE(t) is type t’s best choice within QE([0,t]).
For x ∈ [0,x 0), it is easily shown (in each case) that 0 ∈ Mx and, given (6), every type t
prefers its equilibrium outcome to (x,0);t h e r e f o r e ,l e tPE
x place all probability on t =0 .
For any unchosen x>x 0,l e txL be the greatest chosen action less than x, tH
x be the greatest
type choosing xL,a n dtL
x be the inﬁnum of types choosing xL. For any unchosen x>x 0
29with QE(t) >x , one can show (in each case) that tH
x ∈ Mx and every type t prefers its equi-
librium outcome to (x,tH
x ); therefore, let Px place all probability on tH
x . For any unchosen
x>x 0 with QE(t) <x , one can show (in each case) that Mx ∩[0,t L
x] is nonempty and every
type t prefers its equilibrium outcome to (x,tL
x); therefore, let Px be any distribution over
Mx ∩ [0,t L
x]. T h e ni ne a c hc a s e(QE,PE) is an equilibrium and satisﬁes the D1 criterion.
Step 3F: If (6) is satisﬁed, for any equilibrium (Q,P) satisfying the D1 criterion, Q and
QE (the unique equilibrium action function within Q2) coincide on a set of full measure.
One can verify that any equilibrium satisfying the D1 criterion must have the following
properties: (1) no type chooses x>1
2 (any type choosing x>1
2 would deviate to a slightly
lower transfer in light of Lemma 2 and the inferences implied by the D1 criterion), (2) choices
are weakly monotonic in type (follows from property (1) and Lemma 1), (3) there is no pool
at any action other than x0 and 1
2 (the proof is similar to that of step 1D).
First we claim that Q(t) ≥ x0 ∀t. W ew i l lp r o v et h a tQ(0) ≥ x0; the claim then follows
from property (2). If Q(0) <x 0,t h e nB(PQ(0))=0(property (3)), so U(Q(0),B(PQ(0)),0) ≤
U(0,0,0). Using property (2) and part (3) of Assumption 1, one can show that B(Px0) ≥
mint∈[0,t] B( b H
p
t ),s ob y( 6 ) ,U(x0,B(Px0),0) >U(Q(0),B(PQ(0)),0), a contradiction.
Next we claim that Q(t)=x0 for some t>0. If not, then by property (2) we have
B(H)=B(Px0),a n df o rs u ﬃciently small t>0, B(PQ(t)) ≤ B(H). Given that Q(t) >x 0 >
x∗(t) for small t,s u c ht would prefer (x0,B(Px0)) to (Q(t),B(PQ(t))),ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Next we claim that Q(t) >x 0 for some t<t.I f n o t , t h e n B(Px0)=B(H) and (applying
the D1 criterion) B(Px)=t for x slightly greater than x0,s oa l lt y p e sc o u l db e n e ﬁcially
deviate to that x, a contradiction.
Property (2) and the last three claims imply that ∃ t0 ∈ (0,t) such that Q(t)=x0 for
t ∈ [0,t 0),a n dQ(t) >x 0 for t ∈ (t0,t]. Now we claim that for all t>t 0, Q(t) ∈ {St0(t), 1
2}.
The claim is obviously true if Q(t)=1
2 for all t ∈ (t0,t]. By properties (1) and (2), there is
only one other possibility: ∃ t1 ∈ (t0,t] such that Q(t) ∈ (x0, 1
2) for t ∈ (t0,t 1),a n dQ(t)=1
2
for t ∈ (t1,t]. Arguing as in step 1F, we see that ∃ z ≥ x0 such that Q(t)=St0,z(t) for
30t ∈ (t0,t 1). W em u s th a v ez ≥ x∗(t0): if not, then by equation (1), Q0(t)=S0
t0,z(t) < 0 for
t close to t0, contrary to property (2). Thus, z ≥ max{x0,x ∗(t0)}. N e x tw er u l eo u tz>
max{x0,x ∗(t0)}: in that case, for suﬃciently small ε > 0, max{x0,x ∗(t0)} + ε is not chosen
by any type, and it can be shown that the D1 criterion implies B(Pmax{x0,x∗(t0)}+ε) ≥ t0,s o
for small η > 0 type t0 + η strictly prefers (max{x0,x ∗(t0)} + ε, t0) to (Q(t0 + η), t0 + η),a
contradiction. Thus, z =m a x {x0,x ∗(t0)}, which establishes the claim.
Thus, Q must fall into one of three categories: (a) ∃ t0 ∈ (0,t) such that Q(t)=x0 for
t ∈ [0,t 0) and Q(t)=1
2 for t ∈ (t0,t];( b )∃ t0 ∈ (0,t) with St0(t) ≤ 1
2 such that Q(t)=x0 for
t ∈ [0,t 0) and Q(t)=St0(t) for t ∈ (t0,t];o r( c )∃ t0 ∈ (0,t) and t1 ∈ (t0,t) with St0(t1) ≤ 1
2
such that Q(t)=x0 for t ∈ [0,t 0), Q(t)=St0(t) for t ∈ (t0,t 1),a n dQ(t)=1
2 for t ∈ (t0,t].
If Q falls into categories (a) or (b), let Q∗(t)=Q(t) for t 6= t0,a n dQ∗(t0)=x0;i fQ falls
into category (c), let Q∗(t)=Q(t) for t/ ∈ {t0,t 1}, Q∗(t0)=x0,a n dQ∗(t1)=St0(t1).I n
each case, one can show that, because Q is an equilibrium action function, so is Q∗;a l s o ,
Q∗ ∈ Q2,a n dQ and Q∗ coincide on a set of full measure. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 : To reﬂect the dependence of t∗
0 (deﬁn e di ns t e p3 A )o np,w ew i l l
use the notation t∗
0(p).L e t b t0(p) equal t∗
0(p) when either a blended single-pool or double-pool
equilibrium exists, and the solution to the equality in (5) when a double-pool equilibrium
exists. Let t∗
1(p) equal the solution to (3) when a blended double-pool equilibrium exists,
t when a blended single-pool equilibrium exists, and b t0(p) when a double-pool equilibrium
exists. Regardless of which type of equilibrium prevails, types t ∈ [0,b t0(p)] choose x =0
and types t ∈ (t∗
1(p),t] choose x = 1
2. We demonstrate that b t0(p) is strictly increasing in p,
and t∗
1(p) is increasing in p (strictly when t∗
1(p) < t), which establishes the theorem.
Step 4A: b t0(p) and t∗
1(p) are continuous in p.C o n t i n u i t y o f t∗
0(p) follows from unique-
ness and continuity of the functions in (2). For similar reasons, when a solution to















, the solutions to (2) and the
equality in (5) coincide. Thus, b t0(p) is continuous. Continuity of the solution to (3) (when
31it exists) follows from the following observations: (1) t∗
0(p) is continuous in p,( 2 )St0(t) is



















0(p) w o u l dg a i nb yd e v i a t i n gt oQ(t)=St∗
0(p)(t)), and it is easy to check that t∗
0(p) satisﬁes

















then t solves (3). Thus, t∗
1(p) is continuous.
Step 4B: t∗










.C o n s i d e r p0 and p00 <p 0.O n e c a n v e r i f y t h a t b Hp00
τ (t)=λ b Hp0









∈ (0,1) and L(t)=
H(min{τ,t})
H(τ) .F o r τ ≤ t∗
0(p00), max





.S i n c e t h e s u p p o r t o f L is nondegenerate, Assumption










for τ ≤ t∗
0(p00).N o t e t h a t ξ(t),d e ﬁn e di ns t e p3 A ,i s





> ξ(τ) for τ ≤ t∗
0(p00),s ot∗
0(p0) >t ∗
0(p00),a sc l a i m e d .
Step 4C: If a double-pool equilibrium exists for p0 and p00 <p 0,t h e nb t0(p0) > b t0(p00).






,a n dt h a t
b t0(p) ≤ t∗





is weakly decreasing in τ for τ ≤ t∗
0(p) (step










for τ ≤ t∗
0(p00) (step 4B). Note that ζ(t),a sd e ﬁned in






τ ≤ b t0(p00),s ob t0(p0) > b t0(p00), as desired.
Step 4D: If a blended double-pool equilibrium exists for p0 and p00 <p 0,t h e nt∗
1(p0) >
t∗
1(p00).W e k n o w t∗
0(p0) >t ∗
0(p00).S i n c e St∗
0(p00) (t∗





0(p0) (t) <S t∗
0(p00) (t) for all t>t ∗
0(p0) (Lemma 3(e)). Analogously to step 1A,
deﬁne ψ











. We can rewrite the solution
for t∗
1(p) (when a blended double-pool equilibrium exists) as ψ
p(t)=B(Ht).A r g u i n g a s i n
step 1A, one can show that ψ
p(t) is decreasing and continuous in t, while B(Ht) is increasing
and continuous in t (and independent of p). Moreover, since St∗
0(p0) (t) <S t∗















(t). Thus, the value of t
satisfying ψ
p(t)=B(Ht) is larger for p = p0 than for p = p00. ¤
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